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Abstract:  
This article examines the provisions in the 2010 Russian-Norwegian Treaty on 
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
dealing with the management of transboundary hydrocarbon resources. How 
compatible is the unitisation mechanism in the Treaty with Russian and 
Norwegian legislation? Will there be tension between Russian and Norwegian 
interpretations? How does Russian and Norwegian legislation support or 
challenge the concept of a “unit operator” in a cross-border unitisation? What are 
the possible concerns and pitfalls related to mechanisms for consultations and 
procedures for dispute resolution? 
 
Keywords:  Unitisation, Barents Sea, delimitation, Norway, Russia, unit operator, joint 
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I. Introduction 
The concept of absolute ownership to petroleum rights has long been challenged by the 
migratory nature of hydrocarbons that straddle state boundaries without respect for delimitation 
lines or licensing demarcations.1 The current international trend in developing transboundary 
hydrocarbon resources favours the concept of unitisation rather than the rule of capture.2 
Neighbouring states negotiate a framework for the joint coordinated development of 
transboundary deposits to ensure more efficient, fair and responsible management.3 This 
approach offers protection against the possibility of competitive drilling from either side of the 
boundary.4 It results in enhanced oil recovery, lower development costs, a fair and equitable 
distribution between parties, and improved ecological efficiency. Joint petroleum development is 
practised by several countries, but has been found to be counter-productive to the above-
mentioned objectives of unitisation.5  
“Efficient and responsible management of their hydrocarbon resources” is one of the 
major commitments in the Russian-Norwegian Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation 
in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (the 2010 Cooperation Treaty).6 The 2010 Treaty 
defines a single maritime boundary that divides the States’ continental shelves and exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,7 obliges Norway and Russia to 
continue their cooperation in the sphere of fisheries (Annex I), and Annex II contains provisions 
for the development of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. The Treaty was negotiated in 
English, then translated into Norwegian and Russian, and signed on 12 September 2010, with 
both texts being equally authentic.8 It was ratified by the two countries and came into force on 7 
July 2011.9  
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One of the longest delimitation lines in the world is believed to cross significant 
hydrocarbon deposits.10  
This article examines the 2010 Cooperation Treaty looking at the applicable national 
legislation and international legal mechanisms for the management of transboundary 
hydrocarbon resources. How compatible is the unitisation mechanism in the Treaty with Russian 
and Norwegian legislation? Does the Russian and Norwegian legislation support or challenge the 
concept of cross-border unitisation? Might there be tension between Russian and Norwegian 
interpretations?  
The first section considers how the concept of unitisation is situated in the multi-layered 
legal framework. What is meant by a “unit operator” in Annex II of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty 
emerges as a key issue where understandings may differ. What is then presented is an overview 
of the mechanisms for consultations and procedures for dispute resolution in the 2010 
Cooperation Treaty noting the possible concerns and pitfalls that exist. 
II. The Legal Framework  
The regulation of cross-border unitisation between neighbouring states has often relied on a 
three-layer legal framework: international, national and private.11 This article focuses primarily 
on the first two - the international and national.  
There are no general binding rules in international law governing cross-border 
unitisation.12 In 2006 the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) developed a 
model contract form for international unitisation and unit operating agreements.13 The model 
forms a comprehensive basis for bilateral agreements.14  Although the 2006 form is only a guide, 
it represents an important reference point in the petroleum industry.  
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While international law and practice does not directly address issues of cross-border 
unitisation, it does offer a few guiding principles and strong encouragement for cooperative 
development of transboundary hydrocarbon resources.15 As already noted, such cooperation is 
embedded in the 2010 Cooperation Treaty.  
Article 5.2 of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty sets the conditions for the commencement of 
the negotiation process on cross-border unitisation – there must be a hydrocarbon deposit on the 
continental shelf of one of the states that the other party is of the opinion that it extends into its 
continental shelf.  
At this stage, several scenarios have been considered. Dr. Andrey Krivorotov has 
proposed that if the other party does not submit convincing data that the deposit extends into its 
shelf, the hydrocarbon deposit can be developed unilaterally by the former party.16 If the other 
party is able to show that the hydrocarbon deposit is transboundary, either state may require that 
an agreement on its exploitation “as a unit” (unitisation agreement) is to be reached in 
accordance with Annex II of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty.17  
This unitisation provision is found in many agreements, for example, the 2005 United 
Kingdom-Norway Agreement.18 More generally, the 2010 Cooperation Treaty replicates 
Norway’s unitisation practice in the North Sea with many of the provisions in the Cooperation 
Treaty modelled on other agreements entered into by Norway, such as, the 1965 Agreement 
between Norway and the United Kingdom on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.19 
The signing of a Unitisation Agreement is one of the milestones in the transboundary 
unitisation process.20 Article 1 of Annex II of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty envisages a separate 
unitisation agreement for every transboundary deposit and sets out the main elements for such 
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agreements, including the determination of tract participation which is the respective equity 
interest assigned to each licensee or license group in the unit.  
The next step is the reaching of an agreement between the holders of domestic licenses 
for the development of the cross-boundary deposit (the licensees), with the goal being the 
development of the field as a whole with an agreed plan, commonly termed a unit operating 
agreement or joint operating agreement. This inter-licensee agreement is to specify how the field 
is to be developed. Such an agreement requires the approval by both states without undue 
delay.21  
 Not all aspects of cross-border unitisation are clear or set out in the 2010 Cooperation 
Treaty. Various questions remain to be clarified in further discussions between the parties. As a 
result, national laws, agreements between the governments and the licensees authorising 
development (e.g., a license, concession or production-sharing agreement) and current practices 
may be used as inspiration to further develop cooperative arrangements.  
 Russian regulation of petroleum activities draws on a significant number of sources, 
including different federal laws, regulations and presidential decrees. Here, the focus is only on 
those laws that are of key importance to the regulation of petroleum activities on the Russian 
continental shelf. These are the Tax Code,22 the Law on Subsoil,23 the Federal Law on the 
Continental Shelf24 and the Federal Law on Production-sharing Agreements.25 These laws apply 
to all types of mineral deposits, including gold, silver and other minerals – not only to petroleum 
or offshore hydrocarbons. Russia does not have a specific petroleum law, although it does have a 
law governing certain aspects of the country’s gas sector, the Federal Law on Gas Supply in the 
Russian Federation.26 More critically, there is no specific law that enables unitisation in Russia. 
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The main source for the regulation of petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental 
shelf is the Norwegian Petroleum Act.27 Various other laws are also relevant, but the total 
number of such laws is significantly lower than in Russia.28 Unitisation is regulated by the 
Petroleum Act, Section 4-7 on joint petroleum activities:  
If a petroleum deposit extends over more than one block with different licensees, or 
onto the continental shelf of another state, efforts shall be made to reach agreement 
on the most efficient co-ordination of petroleum activities in connection with the 
petroleum deposit as well as on the apportionment of the petroleum deposit. 
Agreements on joint exploration drilling shall be submitted to the Ministry. 
Agreements on joint production, transportation, utilisation and cessation of 
petroleum activities shall be submitted to the Ministry for approval. If consensus on 
such agreements is not reached within a reasonable time, the Ministry may determine 
how such joint petroleum activities shall be conducted, including the apportionment 
of the deposit. 
 
III. Unit Operator 
In a typical cross-border unitisation, the straddling field is developed as a unit by a single 
operator (a unit operator) appointed jointly by the licensees or the license groups of each 
country.29 For Norway this is a familiar practice.30 Russia, however, has less experience 
regarding international cooperation on transboundary hydrocarbon development.31 Such 
differences may lead to differing perceptions between the two states, including as regards the 
definition and status of a unit operator.  
The status of a unit operator in a joint operation is not evident in the 2010 Cooperation 
Treaty. According to Article 1.6(d) of Annex II, the unitisation agreement is to provide for the 
obligation of each party “to require the legal persons holding rights to exploit a transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposit as a unit to appoint a unit operator as their joint agent in accordance with 
the provisions set out in the Unitisation Agreement…”32 However, there are important 
discrepancies between the Russian and Norwegian texts. 
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While in the Russian and English version each party is obliged “to require” 
(“требовать”) the appointment of a unit operator; in the Norwegian text the parties have the 
obligation “to impose” (“å pålegge”) such an appointment.33 This, as discussed below, is 
grounded in the different approach the Russians and Norwegians have respecting the 
appointment of an operator. 
Another legal inconsistency in Article 1.6(d) arises regarding the term a “transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposit” in the English and Norwegian text (en grenseoverskridende 
petroleumsforekomst); whereas the Russian text is a “transboundary hydrocarbon field” 
(трансграничного месторождения углеводородов). In Norway, a petroleum deposit, once 
discovered, receives the status of a “field” (or becomes part of an existing field), when the 
licensees have decided to develop it and a plan for development and operation has been 
approved, or granted exemption for, by the relevant authorities.34 In Russian legislation, Article 
10 of the Subsoil Law35 correctly replaces the term “subsoil plots/deposit” (участки недр) with 
the term “field” (месторождение полезных ископаемых) as works proceed from exploration to 
production phase.  
However, there is another aspect of usage of the term “field,” related to the appointment 
procedure of a unit operator. On the Russian side, it is clear that the appointment of a unit 
operator is required only by the holders of the production license. Article 1.6(d) of Annex II 
applies, therefore, to the production phase and not to the exploration phase. This interpretation is 
confirmed by a comparison of Articles 1.6(a) and 1.6(d) of Annex II. While Article 1.6(d) of 
Annex II in the Russian text refers to the production phase and “the legal persons holding the 
rights to exploit (“правами на разработку”) a transboundary hydrocarbon field,” Article 1.6(a) 
refers to both the exploration and production phase “relevant legal persons holding rights to 
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explore for and exploit (“правами на разведку и разработку”) hydrocarbons.” In addition, 
Article 1.6(a) refers to “hydrocarbons” and not to a “transboundary hydrocarbon field” as in 
Article 1.6(d). 
The situation is not that clear on the Norwegian side. Article 1.6(d) in Norwegian text 
refers to “the legal persons holding the rights to utilisation” (“rettighetene til å utnytte”), while 
Article 1.6(a) refers to “relevant legal persons holding rights to explore for and exploit” 
(“rettighetene til undesøkelse etter og utvinning”). The Norwegian licensing system consists of 
an exploration license (Petroleum Act, Section 2-136), a production licence (Petroleum Act, 
Section 3-1) and a specific license to install and to operate facilities, (Petroleum Act, Section 4-
3), in addition to a plan for development and operation (Petroleum Act, Section 4-2) and a 
decommissioning plan (Petroleum Act, Section 5-3). Each licence gives the licensee a right to 
conduct limited kinds of activities, including exploration, exploitation (production) and 
utilisation of oil and gas, as defined in Petroleum Act, Section 1-6. According to Petroleum Act, 
Section 1-6(i) the term "utilisation" includes all activities that are not exploitation (production), 
including “cooling in order to liquefy gas, refining and petrochemical activity, production and 
transmission of electric power  and other use of produced petroleum, storage of petroleum as 
well as the construction, placing, operation and use of a facility for the purpose of utilisation.”37 
Utilisation appears not to be production and requires a specific licence to install and to operate 
facilities, as per Petroleum Act, Section 4-3. In this hypothetical case, the wording of the 
Norwegian text of Article 1.6(d) of Annex II of the 2010 Cooperation Agreement indicates that a 
unit operator should be appointed for the utilisation phase, for example to build and operate 
pipelines. However, under public international law, treaties are interpreted “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
  
 
9 
in the light of its object and purpose”, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Therefore, Article 1.6(d) of Annex II in Norwegian text applies also to the production 
phase.   
A unit operator is normally subject to a set of obligations and rights included in a 
unitisation agreement. For example, a unit operator is usually to prepare a development plan for 
exploitation of the transboundary field. Article 1.6(d) of Annex II defines a unit operator as a 
“joint agent.” The appointment procedure is to be specified by the states in the unitisation 
agreement. It is the responsibility of the licensees to appoint a unit operator, but they are obliged 
to follow the mechanism prescribed in the unitisation agreement. Transboundary field production 
cannot commence unless the Russian and Norwegian governments have jointly approved the unit 
operator – and likewise any change of unit operator. 
 Assessing the status of a unit operator becomes complicated when compared with the 
term operator used in the relevant Russian and Norwegian legislation. This issue takes as its 
starting point the legal nature of a legal person holding rights to exploit a transboundary deposit. 
 With most fields on the Norwegian continental shelf, exploration and production 
activities are conducted by license groups. The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
assembles a group of oil companies on the basis of submitted applications. In some cases, license 
groups are formed with direct state participation through Petoro, a company wholly owned by 
the Norwegian state. Each individual member of the license group is awarded a production 
license and is commonly referred to as a “licensee.” These licensees are required to conclude a 
standard joint operating agreement. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy tasks one of the 
licensees with leading and conducting the day-to-day management of operations on behalf of the 
license group.38 As per Section 3-7 of the Petroleum Act, the appointed company is referred to as 
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an “operator.” An operator may farm out certain tasks to external contractors and those in turn to 
subcontractors. The status of an operator under the Norwegian petroleum legislation is, therefore, 
very similar to that of a unit operator in cross-border unitisation. 
  Unlike the Norwegian resource management approach, exploitation of petroleum 
deposits in Russia is rarely conducted by an operator on behalf of a group of companies, though 
there are exceptions. The oil and gas projects offshore of Sakhalin involve production-sharing 
agreements (PSAs), and are being developed under individual PSAs negotiated by the 
participants with the Russian state that were concluded prior to the enactment of the Federal Law 
on Production Sharing Agreements. For the Sakhalin 2 field an operating company - Sakhalin 
Energy Investment Company Ltd. has been formed.39 For Sakhalin 1 the set-up is different, as 
Exxon Neftegas Limited, a subsidiary of ExxonMobil, is the operator on behalf of the partners in 
the project.40 However, both of these projects are PSA’s. According to Article 7 of the 
Production Sharing Agreements Law, the investors may designate an operator to carry out the 
work under a PSA.41 PSAs have become controversial in Russia and the PSA approach has not 
been applied to new projects since the 1990s. 
More recently, in Russia, a licensing regime has been used for offshore developments 
governed by the Subsoil Law42 and the Continental Shelf Law.43 Even though the concept of an 
offshore operator is not defined in these laws, it can be identified by analysing the Russian 
petroleum license system and the Russian Tax Code.44 According to Article 2.1 of the Subsoil 
Law, natural resource areas in the internal waters, territorial seas and the continental shelf of the 
Russian Federation are considered as having Federal significance and thus are classified as 
“areas of Federal importance.” Areas of Federal importance must be approved by the 
Government of Russia and are officially published by Rosnedra.45 Pursuant to Article 9(3) of the 
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Subsoil Law, licenses for using areas of Federal importance on the continental shelf may only be 
granted to Russian legal entities. These entities must have at least five years’ experience in 
Russian continental shelf exploration or production. Further, the Russian Federation is required 
to own or control more than 50 % of equity capital.46 In practice, this means that there are only 
three Russian oil and gas companies which may be granted licenses to use subsoil areas on the 
continental shelf – Rosneft, Gazprom and Zarubezhneft. Other companies, including foreign 
ones, may participate in offshore projects but only as partners on the basis of service agreements. 
As a result, some oil and gas projects have been structured as incorporated joint ventures. 
According to Article 16.2 of the Russian Continental Shelf Law, the licensee may, on a 
contractual basis, engage an “implementer” or an “executor” (“исполнитель”) for conducting 
work (services) related to the construction, operation and use of artificial islands, installations 
and facilities. The service provider may be a Russian or a foreign entity.  
In certain cases, “the executor” may be referred to as an “operator,” based on a special 
concept in the Tax Code – “an operator of a new offshore hydrocarbon field”-  introduced for all 
new offshore fields in 2013.47 The amendments were intended to improve the investment 
environment for offshore hydrocarbon development within Russian internal sea waters, its 
territorial sea, on Russia’s continental shelf and in the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea, with 
provision for commercial extraction to commence on or after 1 January 2016.48 (Article 11.1) 
 In order to qualify as an operator of a new offshore field in Russia, a legal entity (whether 
Russian or foreign) must satisfy the three conditions set out in Article 25.7 of the Tax Code.49 
First, a licensee (or one of its affiliates) is to have a direct or indirect equity participation in such 
a legal entity. However, under the Tax Code there are no requirements or restrictions concerning 
the percentage share. Second, the operator should conduct at least one type of extraction 
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operation (either itself or by hiring contractors) at a new offshore hydrocarbon field. Finally, 
operations at a new offshore hydrocarbon field are to be conducted according to an agreement 
between operator and licensee whereby a fee is to be paid to the operator, calculated on the basis 
of the volume of hydrocarbons produced and/or revenues earned from the sale of such 
hydrocarbons. In international parlance, such operator agreements are known as “risk service 
contracts.” Before this concept was adopted in Russian legislation, Shtokman Development AG 
had, in 2008, established as a joint venture between OAO Gazprom, Total S.A. and Statoil ASA 
as a practical example of a legal entity that met all the above-mentioned criteria for an operator. 
 This analysis of the legal prisms through which Russian and Norwegian stakeholders 
might view future joint operations regarding a unit operator reveals considerable differences and 
potential difficulties. First and foremost, the countries differ in their perceptions of an “operator.” 
The differences between the parties’ anchor-points in national legislation may lead to differing 
expectations of joint-field development mechanisms, as well as misperceptions of the 
expectations of the other party. As seen above, an “operator” in Norwegian law and practice has 
a lead role and broad responsibilities; whereas an “operator” to the extent the concept is used in 
Russian law and regulations, has a more limited role. However, it is not impossible to provide to 
an operator under Russian law functions similar to those common in the Norwegian practice.  
IV. Resolution of Disputes  
1. Introduction 
The effectiveness of the 2010 Treaty, as with other international agreements, hinges on 
compliance. This relies on a high degree of common understanding and the absence of major 
discrepancies between the parties. As shown above, the signing of a unitisation agreement does 
not necessarily resolve all issues relating to unitisation. A unitisation agreement normally 
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provides a new starting point for further discussions. The parties can be expected to protect their 
fundamental interests, including those related to health, safety, environment, tax income, 
employment, hydrocarbon production and metering. If they should fail to agree on procedural or 
technical matters, the 2010 Cooperation Treaty proscribes mechanisms for consultations and a 
set of procedures for dispute resolution.  
 According to Article 5.4 of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty, any disagreement between the 
parties concerning a transboundary deposit “shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 2-4 of 
Annex II” and such disagreements are to be settled “as rapidly as possible.”50 Once the parties 
have made every effort to resolve the impasse, they are encouraged to jointly “consider all 
options.” In addition to a general duty to resolve issues through consultations from the pre-
unitisation to abandonment stage, Annex II sets forth two forms of compulsory dispute resolution 
for issues respecting unitisation: ad hoc arbitration, and expert determination. Each of these is 
briefly discussed in turn below. What comes first, however, involves obligations on information 
exchange and mutual consultations. This is followed by an examination of Article 4 of Annex II, 
which creates a mechanism for independent expert determination in cases where the parties 
cannot agree on apportionment. On these matters, the Cooperation Treaty largely follows the 
provisions of the 2008 Agreement on Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits between Norway 
and Iceland.51  
2. Consultations and Joint Commission  
The general obligations of regular information exchange and of on-site inspections are set out in 
Article 1.11 of Annex II of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty. Article 1.10 of Annex II highlights the 
obligation for mutual consultation with respect to national health, safety and environment 
legislation. Article 1.13 of Annex II requires the establishment of a Norwegian-Russian Joint 
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Commission, with a clearly stipulated mandate to be responsible for ensuring a continuous 
consultation and an exchange of information “on issues pertaining to any planned or existing 
unitised hydrocarbon deposits.” 
 Although the 2010 Cooperation Treaty is silent as to further details, the inspiration for 
future collaboration can be found in the pre-existing bilateral arrangements on cross-border 
economic activities between Russia and Norway, such as the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries 
Commission52 and the Joint Norwegian-Russian Commission on Environmental Protection.53 
Under the auspices of these bodies, both countries have been successfully cooperating on 
fisheries and in the fields of research and regulation for sustainable Barents Sea management. 
Both commissions have been active for numerous decades. Collaborative fisheries management, 
in particular, is widely regarded as setting an example for other states.54  
 Does Article 1.13 of Annex II of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty imply the establishment of 
the same type of institutional mechanism for Russian-Norwegian cooperation on unitisation 
issues? The experience of the fisheries sector shows that establishing a system for cooperation 
can help to develop expertise, and ensure on-going consultation and information exchange. 
Another approach could be based on the proliferation of joint commissions by creating 
individual joint commissions for each separate transboundary deposit, justified by the fact that 
each straddling field situation is unique. Nigel Banks has argued for interpreting the 2010 
Cooperation Treaty provisions in favour of this alternative.55 Obviously, Article 1.13 structurally 
belongs to Annex II Article 1, which determines the terms of each unitisation agreement 
concerning exploitation of each transboundary deposit, so that a joint commission would have to 
be established in every case of unitisation.  
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However, the proliferation solution appears to be contradictory to the aim of ensuring a 
“continuous consultation and exchange of information.”56 It would also deviate from the earlier 
Russian-Norwegian practice of joint commissions, with all advantages these have entailed.57 In 
addition, based on the Russian text, Article 1.13 of Annex II, which refers to consultations “on 
issues pertaining to any (“любым”) planned or existing unitised hydrocarbon deposits.” Such a 
clarification is absent from the Norwegian text. This seemingly minor inconsistency in 
translation might be important for the choice of forum, but does not affect the obligation to 
collaborate. However, if the intention of the parties were to continue the tradition within 
institutionalised joint commissions, it would have been less confusing to place the consultation 
provisions outside of Article 1 of Annex II. In any case, the role of the joint commissions is 
usually to resolve issues through consultation before a matter becomes an actual dispute. As 
presented here, the joint commission is intended to function as a support structure with a 
preventive mandate. 
3. Expert Determination on Apportionment 
Disagreements on the apportionment of hydrocarbon deposits can be difficult to resolve through 
consultations thus making a special form of dispute settlement necessary. As with many other 
agreements dealing with transboundary deposits,58 the apportionment issue is to be decided by an 
independent expert if the parties fail to manage the dispute themselves. In contrast to an arbitral 
award, as described below, an expert determination requires specialized knowledge on specific 
technical matters within the petroleum industry and the ability to conduct a comprehensive data 
analyses. 
  The expert’s decision can prove vital for the parties. The apportionment of reserves has, 
for example, determined the basis for tract participation in the case of the transboundary 
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Norway-UK Flyndre Field unitisation.59 However, the Cooperation Delimitation Treaty is 
unclear as for which of the possible matters in dispute the appointed expert involvement is 
allowed or required: “1) basis for tract participation; 2) quantification of initial tract 
participation; 3) key elements of technical procedures for redetermination of tract participation; 
4) redetermination of tract participation; 5) expansion and reduction of unit area and/or unit 
interval.”60 
 Strong interest from each side of the border in tract participation is reflected in Article 4 
of Annex II of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty. It states that an independent expert should be 
appointed by the governments, but the process of expert selection, the expert’s mandate and 
decision-making method are not prescribed. These matters are usually covered in detail by the 
unitisation and joint operating agreement. The regular procedure seems to be for each licensee or 
license group to nominate a prescribed number of candidate experts with the expert chosen in 
order of preference or by drawing from the lists. 
 As stipulated by Article 4.1 of Annex II, the final decision of an expert concerning 
apportionment is binding on the parties. This is clear in both the Norwegian and the Russian 
texts. Further, in the 2010 Cooperation Treaty there is no provision for the possibility of 
challenging the expert’s decision before an Arbitral Tribunal.61  
 According to Article 4.2 of Annex II, “notwithstanding the provisions contained in 
paragraph 1 (Article 4.1): 
 the Parties may agree that the hydrocarbon deposit shall be reapportioned between 
them;” (English text of the Treaty); 
 the Parties may agree on a new apportionment of the hydrocarbon deposit between them 
(Norwegian text: en ny fordeling); 
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 the Parties may agree on another apportionment of the hydrocarbon field between them 
(Russian text “об ином распределении”).  
While the wording in Norwegian refers to reapportioning (redetermination), the Russian text 
may be understood as opening for the possibility of challenging the expert’s decision – if, for 
example, it proved to be commercially deleterious for Russia. In line with this interpretation, it 
may be assumed that the Russian text of the treaty has no provisions for the possibility of 
redetermination. In any event, Article 4.2 of Annex II has been shaped by unitisation practice 
from the North Sea, which allows for at least one redetermination.62 Redetermination is a very 
costly and often problematic exercise and one which both parties would try to avoid in practice.63  
4. Ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal  
As noted, any disagreements on the apportionment of the hydrocarbon deposit are to be solved 
by an expert. If the Parties fail to reach agreement respecting the interpretation, implementation 
or application of the unitisation agreement, the 2010 Cooperation Treaty contemplates a two-step 
procedure. The first step involves “negotiation or any other agreed procedure” to resolve 
disagreements. Underlying uncertainties and controversy are to be discussed and resolved on the 
abovementioned premise as rapidly as possible, and within six months. Otherwise, as a second 
step, either of the parties may submit the dispute to an “ad hoc arbitral tribunal” for a binding 
decision.64  
 Ad hoc arbitration is to be administered by the parties. Article 3.2 of Annex II specifies 
the appointment procedure of an arbitral tribunal. The 2010 Cooperation Treaty follows the 
standard appointment procedure for ad hoc arbitrations. A tribunal should consist of three 
members. Each party is to appoint one arbitrator within three months of a request to do so. The 
Treaty imposes no other special requirements in this regard. Should a party refuse to participate 
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in the arbitration proceedings, for example by failing to appoint an arbitrator within the 
stipulated time limit, the President of the International Court of Justice is empowered to make 
such an appointment. The two appointed arbitrators are to elect a third arbitrator within one 
month of the appointment of the second arbitrator. In default of such an appointment, the 
President of the International Court of Justice has the same power. The third arbitrator is to serve 
as the Chair. The Chair is to be impartial and should be neither a Norwegian nor a Russian 
citizen or resident. In accordance with Article 3.1 and Article 3.3, para. 2 of Annex II, the legal 
mandate of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal is limited to resolving issues that have arisen pursuant to 
the unitisation agreement.65 Therefore, the arbitration provisions do not apply to disputes about 
the existence or extension of the hydrocarbon deposit or the possibility of exploiting the deposit 
as a unit. In such cases, the parties are to attempt to settle the matter by discussions under Article 
5.2, para. 2 of the 2010 Cooperation Treaty.  
 The arbitral tribunal determines its own rules of procedure and the decisions are to be 
taken by majority vote of its members.66 The tribunal’s decision is binding on the parties and 
shall be enforced within the unitisation agreement.  
V. Conclusions 
Successful examples of transboundary field development around the world show that the concept 
of unitisation is viable. However, there are also examples of areas where petroleum development 
has been either delayed or put on hold because of difficulties in implementing unitisation 
agreements. From a legal perspective, as has been noted that “no jurisdiction has been able to 
produce a perfect solution for all the problems and difficulties associated with unitisation.”67  
 The current concept of cross-border unitisation is not fully developed in international 
law. The basis for state cooperation are boundary delimitation agreements. The 2010 
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Cooperation Treaty stands as a significant, state-of-the-art bilateral model for the management of 
transboundary hydrocarbon resources and is expected to provide the foundation for future 
cooperation in the Arctic and the development of further norms, internationally and nationally.68 
Nevertheless, the Treaty contains several instances of inconsistency between the Russian and 
Norwegian texts, although the two are to be regarded as equally authentic. Further, the parties 
appear to differ in their understanding of the principles and procedures respecting transboundary 
unitisation. This article has illustrated the latter point by examining the concept of a “unit 
operator” through comparing the relevant Russian and Norwegian legislation on petroleum 
licensing. Under the Norwegian legal framework, the status of an operator is similar to that of a 
“unit operator” in cross-border unitisation – the operator is one of the licensees appointed or 
approved by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy to lead and conduct the day-to-
day operations on behalf of the license group. However, the Russian legislation has a different 
perception indicating that an operator is a legal entity (joint venture), contractually engaged by 
licensee as service provider to conduct works where the licensee has a direct or indirect equity 
participation. 
  These and other discrepancies between the expectations and experiences of the two 
parties may stall transboundary field development. However, Russia and Norway have agreed on 
several mechanisms for consultations and procedures for dispute resolution. In addition to a 
Russian–Norwegian Joint Commission for consultations, there are two forms of dispute 
settlement, ad hoc arbitration and expert determination.  
 Certain issues under the 2010 Cooperation Treaty require further clarification. Whether 
Russia and Norway will succeed in turning the Treaty into an operating model of cooperation 
depends on many factors – not only presence of hydrocarbons – but also there being a common 
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understanding of the crucial principles of unitisation and the ability of the states to understand 
each other. Despite the bilateral tensions both countries have demonstrated an ability to discuss a 
large range of complicated questions. When cooperation is the goal, the parties should be able to 
find a solution. 
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